Why Are State-Business Relations Formalized in Russia’s Authoritarian Regime? A Set-Theoretic Analysis
Benedikt Bender et al.
Abstract
Despite the predominance of informality in Russian state-business relations (SBRs), regional administrations have established diverse institutionalized forms of cooperation with business actors. These include socio-economic development agreements, public-private partnerships, and consultation mechanisms. Utilizing fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), this study systematically examines SBRs across all of Russia’s federal subjects, identifying varying degrees of institutionalization. The findings reveal that strongly institutionalized SBRs, found in fifty-nine out of eighty-three regions, result from four distinct configurations: a monopolistic economy, hegemonic authoritarian politics, personalist politics, and competitive authoritarian politics. The analysis demonstrates that institutionalized SBRs are beneficial for both business and state actors. It offers valuable insights into the rationale behind the formation of formal cooperation between state and businesses, thereby addressing key questions in comparative research on authoritarianism.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.