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Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers

Xiaogang Che et al.

International Economic Review2026https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70056article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We examine a two‐stage selling mechanism design problem, where the buyer makes her report and the seller endogenously decides his effort (hidden investment) to generate a possibly better outside offer. The optimal mechanism shows that the seller's effort depends on the reported value of the buyer; a higher value lowers the seller's incentive to invest in the outside offer. After the price of the outside offer is realized, if the buyer's virtual value is less than the price, the seller takes the outside offer, and a termination fee equal to the virtual value is paid to the buyer.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70056

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@article{xiaogang2026,
  title        = {{Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers}},
  author       = {Xiaogang Che et al.},
  journal      = {International Economic Review},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.70056},
}

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Optimal Selling Mechanisms With Endogenous Seller Outside Offers

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.