We examine how auditors' use of limited liability agreements (LLAs) impact perceptions of private company creditworthiness in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment. Ninety-three United States-based bank loan officers evaluate whether LLA clauses and the size of the company's external auditor impact lending decisions. We use signaling theory to predict, and we find that LLAs decrease perceived creditworthiness, mainly when the company engages a Non-Big4 auditor. We find no difference in perceived creditworthiness when the company employs a Big4 firm, irrespective of including an LLA clause. Supplemental analyses show that lenders perceive that LLA clauses signal higher credit risk and, in turn, decrease perceived creditworthiness. We offer insights into how lenders integrate information about privately held companies into their decisions, which could impact the cost of capital for private companies. Our study should be of interest to preparers and the varied users of financial statements and regulators.