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Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

Scott Duke Kominers

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2024https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.005article
AJG 1
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as matching with slot-specific preferences.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.005

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@article{scott2024,
  title        = {{Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets}},
  author       = {Scott Duke Kominers},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2024},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2024.12.005},
}

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Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.49 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.55 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.