Golden rule in cooperative commons

Sjur Didrik Flåm

Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design2023https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002article
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

This paper considers common use of natural, renewable resources. It identifies good prospects for efficiency and welfare. To be precise, a core outcome -- hence cooperation -- can be secured over time by principal planning of total quotas, and in time by agents who share these in short-term markets. Information flows in two directions: to the principal as market prices and from him as total quantities. Of particular interest is eventual convergence to a golden-rule, steady state.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002

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@article{sjur2023,
  title        = {{Golden rule in cooperative commons}},
  author       = {Sjur Didrik Flåm},
  journal      = {Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design},
  year         = {2023},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.22574/jmid.2023.12.002},
}

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.