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Switching Roles in Experiments: Learning in a Signaling Game

Michael J. Solomon

Review of Law & Economics2026https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2024-0065article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

Abstract In games of asymmetric information, it can be difficult for subjects to understand the true position of their opponents. Theoretically, they should be able to take the information they are given and reason through their opponent’s options, but in practice this could be quite demanding. A potential solution to this problem is to allow subjects to switch roles, thereby gaining an understanding of the other side of the table. In this paper, I look at the effect of role switching on the learning process in a simple signaling game of pretrial bargaining. My findings are mixed: role switching appears to help Subjects reduce some kinds of mistakes, but it also exacerbates other mistakes.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2024-0065

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@article{michael2026,
  title        = {{Switching Roles in Experiments: Learning in a Signaling Game}},
  author       = {Michael J. Solomon},
  journal      = {Review of Law & Economics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2024-0065},
}

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Switching Roles in Experiments: Learning in a Signaling Game

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.