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Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance

Viral V. Acharya et al.

Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting2021https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000053article
AJG 2
Weight
0.42

What the paper says

Why do half of S&P 500 firms have duality, that is, a CEO who is also the Chair of the Board? We show theoretically that duality can play an important role in the competition for CEOs. Empirically, we document that duality changes are concentrated at times when new CEOs are hired and firms are more likely to offer duality to CEOs with greater ability. This finding is robust to different measures of CEO ability and types of succession plans. We also show that the correlation between duality and CEO ability is stronger in industries that feature a greater competition for CEOs.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000053

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{viral2021,
  title        = {{Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance}},
  author       = {Viral V. Acharya et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting},
  year         = {2021},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000053},
}

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Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance

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Evidence weight

0.42

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.20 × 0.4 = 0.08
M · momentum0.80 × 0.15 = 0.12
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.