A Comparative Analysis of VAT and Customs Law vis-à-vis Competition Law - Conflicting Interests of Authorities in Platform Policy?
Pim Jansen & Madeleine Merkx
Abstract
This article explores the growing tension between EU tax/customs enforcement and competition law in the context of digital platforms. While platforms such as online marketplaces are increasingly tasked with collecting VAT and, under proposed reforms, import duties as ‘deemed suppliers’ and ‘deemed importers’, these obligations may inadvertently reinforce market concentration. Larger platforms are better equipped to handle complex compliance duties, while smaller competitors face disproportionate burdens that may hinder entry and innovation. The paper provides a comparative legal analysis of VAT, customs, and competition law frameworks, examining how compliance duties can lead to vertical integration, selfpreferencing, and exclusionary practices. It also discusses possible regulatory solutions, including thresholds, transitional regimes, and exemptions for limited facilitation models. The article ultimately questions whether the same rules that aim to secure public revenue might conflict with the goal of maintaining open, competitive digital markets.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.