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Asymmetric Models of Sales

David P. Myatt & David Ronayne

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics2026https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240437article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We generalize the captive-and-shopper model of sales to allow asymmetries in production costs and captive audiences, in oligopoly. Bothkinds of asymmetry determine the firms that compete (via randomized sales) to serve the price-comparing shoppers, while other firms exploit their captive audiences. In contrast to a model with symmetric costs (but asymmetric captive audiences), there are natural situations in which more than two firms use sales by engaging in pairwisebattles across distinct price intervals. We also study the choice of production technologies via innovation and extensions to consider costly acquisitions of captives and shoppers, and captives’ choice of captor. (JEL D11, D21, D43, L14, O31)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240437

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@article{david2026,
  title        = {{Asymmetric Models of Sales}},
  author       = {David P. Myatt & David Ronayne},
  journal      = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240437},
}

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Asymmetric Models of Sales

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.