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Pay Transparency and Inventor Productivity: Evidence From State‐Level Pay Secrecy Laws

Huasheng Gao et al.

RAND Journal of Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70005article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.56

Abstract

We examine the role of pay transparency in inventor productivity by exploiting the staggered adoption of state‐level pay secrecy laws, which enhance pay transparency in the workplace. We find a significant increase in inventor productivity of firms located in states that have passed such laws relative to firms elsewhere. This relation is more pronounced for firms in states with lower levels of pre‐existing pay transparency. We further show that pay secrecy laws promote inventor productivity by motivating inventors—especially minority inventors—to exert more effort, enhancing the diversity of inventor teams, and encouraging all inventors to pursue promotions.

11 citations

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70005

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@article{huasheng2025,
  title        = {{Pay Transparency and Inventor Productivity: Evidence From State‐Level Pay Secrecy Laws}},
  author       = {Huasheng Gao et al.},
  journal      = {RAND Journal of Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70005},
}

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Pay Transparency and Inventor Productivity: Evidence From State‐Level Pay Secrecy Laws

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Evidence weight

0.56

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.57 × 0.4 = 0.23
M · momentum0.72 × 0.15 = 0.11
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.