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An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes

Uri Gneezy et al.

Experimental Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.5article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.44

Abstract

How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.5

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@article{uri2025,
  title        = {{An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes}},
  author       = {Uri Gneezy et al.},
  journal      = {Experimental Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/eec.2024.5},
}

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An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes

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Evidence weight

0.44

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.32 × 0.4 = 0.13
M · momentum0.57 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.