Optimal reinsurance under endogenous default and background risk

Zongxia Liang et al.

ASTIN Bulletin2026https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2026.10085preprint
AJG 2ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper studies an optimal reinsurance problem for a utility-maximizing insurer, subject to the reinsurer’s endogenous default and background risk. An endogenous default occurs when the insurer’s contractual indemnity exceeds the reinsurer’s available reserve, which is random due to the background risk. We obtain an analytical solution to the optimal contract for two types of reinsurance contracts, differentiated by whether their indemnity functions depend on the reinsurer’s background risk. The results shed light on the joint effect of the reinsurer’s default and background risk on the insurer’s reinsurance demand.

Open via your library →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2026.10085

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{zongxia2026,
  title        = {{Optimal reinsurance under endogenous default and background risk}},
  author       = {Zongxia Liang et al.},
  journal      = {ASTIN Bulletin},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/asb.2026.10085},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Optimal reinsurance under endogenous default and background risk

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.


Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.