How the United Nations targets human rights public diplomacy
Sam R. Bell & Risa Kitagawa
What the paper says
Abstract International organizations employ public diplomacy like states, yet we know little about how they strategically allocate diplomatic resources. We examine determinants of high-level visits by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to understand how this body balances principled goals with strategic constraints. We theorize that visits serve dual functions: signaling international scrutiny to repressive regimes while cultivating soft power where conditions favor human rights progress. Using original data on OHCHR delegation travel (1998-2019), we show that OHCHR visits target highly repressive states but are significantly more likely in places with a greater peacekeeping presence and democratization episodes, which we argue provide reach and create receptive local audiences, respectively. These findings suggest that OHCHR visits are jointly motivated by need and domestic political opportunities for influence. By demonstrating this international organization’s strategic use of visit diplomacy, we shed light on an understudied mechanism for advancing human rights norms.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.