“Ambassador, you’re really spoiling us!” Diplomatic gifts and profligate autocrats
Ole Jacob Sending et al.
What the paper says
Qatar’s “unconditional” gift of a $400 million Boeing 747-8 to Donald Trump serves as a reminder that states have long used diplomatic gifts to impress others, forge bonds, and secure favorable treatment. However, in an age where citizens and media outlets routinely scrutinize public spending, there is good reason to think that not all governments are able to justify lavishing large sums on such interactions. In this paper, we test the claim that autocracies are less constrained in their diplomatic gift giving due to an absence of domestic accountability mechanisms. To evidence this, we draw on a dataset of diplomatic gifts presented to U.S. presidents from 2001 to 2018. Our results show that autocratic regimes systematically spend more on diplomatic gifts than do democracies. Supplementary analyses suggest that this is, in part, due to new media in democracies being able to criticize profligate diplomatic practices. Interviews with Norwegian diplomats corroborate the importance of domestic media scrutiny in shaping diplomatic gift giving. We contribute to scholarship that probes the relationship between regime type and public spending, by showing its relevance to diplomatic interactions.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.