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Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting

Peter Buisseret & Carlo Prato

American Journal of Political Science2026https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70040article
AJG 4*ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We compare multicandidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). We examine a widely held presumption that RCV more effectively incentivizes candidates to pursue broad campaigns that can appeal to all voters, rather than targeting a narrow segment of the electorate. That presumption is correct when preference transfers are competitive, that is, when multiple candidates have a reasonable chance of securing voters' second‐choice support. However, when transfers are uncompetitive due to partisan, ethnic, or cultural alignments, that presumption is reversed: RCV can strengthen candidates' incentives to pursue targeted campaigns.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70040

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@article{peter2026,
  title        = {{Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting}},
  author       = {Peter Buisseret & Carlo Prato},
  journal      = {American Journal of Political Science},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70040},
}

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Politics transformed? Electoral competition under ranked choice voting

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.