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Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation

Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0045article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoners dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening scheme, such as a special zone that requires an entry fee, or a costly label for purchase, to segregate the conditional cooperators from the non-cooperators. We show that institutional intervention of this sort can help the conditional cooperators to prevail when the psychological benefit of cooperating for them is sufficiently strong and the membership of the special zone or the label is inheritable with a sufficiently high probability.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0045

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@article{ethan2025,
  title        = {{Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation}},
  author       = {Ethan Holdahl & Jiabin Wu},
  journal      = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0045},
}

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Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.