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Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence

Massimo Pulejo & Pablo Querubín

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy2026https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240383article
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.37

Abstract

What is the effect of politicians’ wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents’ behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking. (JEL D72, D73, J31, K42)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240383

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@article{massimo2026,
  title        = {{Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence}},
  author       = {Massimo Pulejo & Pablo Querubín},
  journal      = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20240383},
}

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Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.