Agent-based modeling of long-term bank credit: buffer policies vs. selective lending in stochastic growth and decline
Mitja Steinbacher
Abstract
This paper reexamines bank-firm interactions through an agent-based model, focusing on how banks influence long-term capital reallocation in stochastic, cyclical economies. Using an agent-based model with firm demand modeled as Geometric Brownian Motion, the paper studies growth/decline epochs under varying volatility. Unlike prior work focused on liquidity, this paper emphasizes long-term capital stocks and introduces a radial matching mechanism to minimize spatial bias. It extends prior work by introducing preference alignment between banks and firms, modeling credit as a two-stage process: (1) firms signal capital needs, and (2) banks approve/deny requests based on top-down buffer policies or bottom-up firm performance selection. Simulations across growth/decline epochs with varying volatility reveal a policy trade-off: (1) top-down buffers dominate during long-term growth, stabilizing credit allocation and (2) bottom-up selection excels in declines, efficiently restricting capital to high-performing firms. Here, a hybrid approach, combining both strategies, might be most resilient across cycles, suggesting that optimal credit regulation is phase-dependent. These findings challenge one-size-fits-all regulatory approaches and advocate for cycle-sensitive credit policies.
1 citation
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06 |
| M · momentum | 0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.