Controlling or blaming? How members of parliament use performance audit reports
Ruud van Druenen & Sjoerd Keulen
What the paper says
Abstract Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) support parliaments in their scrutiny of the performance of the executive. However, little is known about how members of parliament (MPs) use the institutions’ performance audit reports in their day-to-day work. This study examines the factors that affect the way MPs use performance audits. It focuses on two types of use: controlling use to strengthen parliament’s information position to scrutinize the executive, and more politically oriented offensive use to assert blame for lagging policy results. Multinomial logistic regression models of a newly created dataset of all cases of Dutch MPs’ use of performance audit reports between 2014 and 2023 show that the likelihood of using performance audits for controlling purposes relative to other types of use is predominantly dependent on the institutional setting in which it takes place; controlling use is most likely in committee settings and in written statements. In addition, members of opposition parties tend to use audits more offensively relative to other types of use than members of government parties.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.