Reverse factoring: accounting practices in a regulatory vacuum

Abstract

We examine how firms disclose their use of reverse factoring programs (RFPs)–financial arrangements that accelerate supplier payments through third-party financiers–and how these disclosures affect reported financial positions. Using a global sample of 673 firms from 2011 to 2021, we identify the characteristics of RFP adopters, assess external pressures that drive disclosure (e.g. regulatory enforcement, auditors, analysts, and institutional investors), and analyse whether firms actively manage trade payables to avoid disclosing/reclassifying factored amounts as debt. We find that firms with greater financing needs are more likely to adopt RFPs. Firms operating in high-enforcement jurisdictions, or those with significant analyst following and institutional ownership, more often disclose RFPs–especially when the RFPs are material. Still, only 13% of RFP firms provide any disclosure, often with minimal detail. Our analysis reveals that in jurisdictions without mandatory interim audits, some firms significantly reduce trade payables in the fourth quarter to stay below auditor thresholds and avoid disclosure or reclassification. This behaviour is particularly evident in countries with strong enforcement environments. This paydown pattern is absent where interim audits are required. Our study contributes by offering the first large-sample evidence of how firms respond to regulatory pressures surrounding RFP disclosures. It highlights how differences in enforcement and auditing requirements influence financial reporting behaviour and raises important implications for standard setters seeking to improve transparency around supply chain finance arrangements.