Fair Fares for Vehicle Sharing Systems

Adam N. Elmachtoub & Hyemi Kim

Operations Research2026https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2024.1043article
FT50UTD24AJG 4*ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

Vehicle sharing systems—such as bike, scooter, and car sharing—play a key role in urban transportation, yet algorithmic pricing can lead to inequalities across locations. This paper studies how platforms can incorporate fairness into pricing decisions and the resulting outcomes. We propose two notions of fairness: price fairness, which limits price differences across locations, and access fairness, which equalizes the proportion of demand at each location that has access to the system, determined by affordability and availability. Using a stylized two-location model, the paper analyzes how fairness constraints affect platform revenue, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Although price fairness can sometimes increase consumer surplus at both locations, access fairness always reduces consumer surplus at both locations. A convex relaxation approach is developed for larger networks, and a case study using New York City data illustrates the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency in practice.

Open via your library →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2024.1043

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{adam2026,
  title        = {{Fair Fares for Vehicle Sharing Systems}},
  author       = {Adam N. Elmachtoub & Hyemi Kim},
  journal      = {Operations Research},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2024.1043},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Fair Fares for Vehicle Sharing Systems

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.


Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.