Competing Through Innovation in Networked Manufacturing
Zilong Wang & Hechang Cai
What the paper says
The authors examine how network externalities and various factors shape strategic interactions between manufacturers and technology suppliers in networked manufacturing contexts. Using an evolutionary game model, it explores manufacturers' radical vs. incremental innovation choices alongside suppliers' technology authorization vs. licensing strategies. The results show that both parties' strategies often fluctuate without stabilizing under different initial conditions. While higher returns from radical innovation motivate manufacturers toward breakthrough efforts, suppliers consistently favor licensing regardless of profit-sharing adjustments and are highly sensitive to radical innovation costs. In contrast, changes in licensing fees predominantly influence manufacturers' behaviors. Collaboration costs only lead to minor shifts in evolutionary trajectories.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.