arbiter
JournalsAccount

Hybrid wellbeing and the value of freedom

Pietro Intropi

Economics and Philosophy2025https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000439article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.46

Abstract

Which implications follow for the value of freedom on a hybrid account of wellbeing that appeals to endorsement? On the basis of Olsaretti’s empirical claim that one is unlikely to endorse wellbeing when one is forced to achieve it, I show that standardly on the hybrid account there is a reason to protect people’s freedom to dysfunction, and hence that the freedoms to dysfunction are valuable. I also discuss whether freedom is non-specifically valuable on grounds of endorsement. I advance an epistemic version of freedom’s non-specific value that is especially relevant for a theory of justice that appeals to publicity.

4 citations

Open via your library →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000439

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{pietro2025,
  title        = {{Hybrid wellbeing and the value of freedom}},
  author       = {Pietro Intropi},
  journal      = {Economics and Philosophy},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267124000439},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Hybrid wellbeing and the value of freedom

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.46

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.37 × 0.4 = 0.15
M · momentum0.60 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.