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Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis

Garrett Milam & Andrew Monaco

Games2026https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010001article
AJG 1ABDC B
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0.50

Abstract

This work addresses whether heterogeneity in player endowments influences investment decisions in common pool resource (CPR) games, shedding light on the relationship between inequality and economic decision making. We explore two theoretical avenues from behavioral economics—linear other-regarding preferences and inequity aversion—and examine the predictions of each with a laboratory experiment. Our experimental results roundly reject the majority of these explanations: in treatments with endowment inequality, high endowment individuals invest more in the common pool resource than low endowment individuals. We discuss these results in the context of the literature on psychological entitlement and positional preferences.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010001

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@article{garrett2026,
  title        = {{Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis}},
  author       = {Garrett Milam & Andrew Monaco},
  journal      = {Games},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/g17010001},
}

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Endowment Inequality in Common Pool Resource Games: An Experimental Analysis

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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