Autonomy and its limits in ‘the good society’

Abstract

In arguably his two major works, published more than a century ago, the social psychologist and co-founder of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Graham Wallas, argued first against utilitarian intellectualism for it being excessively reductionist in the face of complex human psychology, but then for a form of intellectualism to instil in people the reasoning abilities required for a large industrialised Great Society to also become a ‘Good Society’. In this essay, I share Wallas’s concern for over-intellectualising human motivation and at the same time believing that an intellectualism of sorts is needed for a social organisation that is tolerable for all. Specifically, I argue that the psychological affects that lie deep within human cognition may have evolved for good reason, and that even in the modern world it is not possible to determine when and where these tendencies lead people astray from their own personal desires. As such, individual autonomy over their choices and behaviours ought to be respected when people impose no substantive harms on others. However, in circumstances where autonomous actions cause substantive external harms, it may often be appropriate to intervene to curtail them. In short, we are faced with the delicate balancing of autonomy and harm when attempting to protect liberty for all. I conclude that in order to arrive at an appropriate balance, we might usefully turn to the writings of Joseph Raz, who intimated that the characteristics of autonomy are to extend people’s opportunities, to improve their agentic capabilities, and to protect them from coercion and manipulation. Raz’s arguments, I contend, offer up a framework for the Good Society, redux.