Pay Gap Matters: Evidence from Bank Liquidity Creation
Shams Pathan et al.
Abstract
Using data on publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies from 1992 to 2019, we examine whether disparities between CEO and non-CEO executive pay affect banks’ liquidity creation. We find that banks with larger CEO pay gaps create more liquidity, but this positive association emerges only after the global financial crisis. A difference-in-differences analysis around the 2011 implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act corroborates these findings: the interaction between post-2011 and the pay-gap measures is positive and significant, implying that post-crisis compensation and governance reforms strengthened the incentive role of pay inequality. The effect is concentrated in on-balance-sheet liquidity creation and in banks with stronger risk-absorbing capacity, low market competition, and sound governance. Together, the results reveal a dynamic link between executive pay structure and bank behavior, suggesting that post-crisis reforms amplified the motivational channel of pay disparity while overly restrictive pay limits could unintentionally dampen banks’ liquidity-creation capacity.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.