Coalition Value Evaluation in Cross-partition Function Games: A Bilateral Bargaining Approach
Guangjing Yang
What the paper says
This paper aims to investigate cooperative games with internalities and externalities across coalitions, where the value of a coalition depends on both its own partition and the coalition structure of non-members. We introduce a class of games known as cross-partition function games (CPFGs) and propose a bilateral bargaining approach to determine the rational cross-partition bargaining payoff (rational CPB payoff) as the value for any given coalition. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of rational threat partition pairs (RTPPs) and show that the rational CPB payoff is unique when RTPPs exist. Additionally, we define the core of the corresponding characteristic function game based on the rational CPB payoff and provide a proof of its non-emptiness for a category of CPFGs.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.