Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks

Abstract

Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads. Specifically, motivated by the real‐world scenarios and pre‐analysis industrial discussions, we combine a Gioia‐based exploratory case study with an analytical model to seek solutions of cross‐border scarce goods bartering at both the government (public) level and capacity reallocation at the firm (private) level. Furthermore, we conduct post‐analysis industrial discussions with managers of semiconductor companies to validate our theoretical and analytical results. We find that the marginal cost and willingness to barter are two critical factors that jointly affect the focal P–P collaborative dyad's net benefits gained from cross‐border bartering. Moreover, the existence of outside options in a cross‐border bartering increases the negotiating position of the focal dyad when interacting with the negotiated P–P dyad. Insights are generated on how the focal firm should strategically prioritize its global customers in capacity reallocation and meanwhile help its own government obtain the much‐needed scarce‐goods for a triple‐win solution. In particular, the focal firm's market power can be strategically leveraged to enhance the focal government's bargaining power. It acts as a noncoercive strategy to help fulfil the focal P–P collaborative dyad's missions and goals in cross‐border reciprocal bartering. We verify that the marginal cost and willingness to barter are the primary factors influencing, respectively, the decisions of the focal firm and government.