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Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model

Domenico Buccella

Czech Economic Review2014article
ABDC C
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

The present paper investigates the effects of bargaining structures and agendas on the quality differentiation/location in the final-goods market. The framework is a unionized duopoly industry in the context of an unconstrained Hotelling linear city model. The presence of labor union(s) and the bargaining processes (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized structure; right-to-manage vs. participatory framework agenda) change the locational incentives of the firms with respect to the case of exogenous production costs. The results reveal that the effect of centralization on the two bargaining agendas is diametrically opposed. More specifically, in the participatory framework, centralization is a centrifugal force, while it is a centripetal force in the right-to-manage. The social welfare consequences are also briefly discussed.

1 citation

Cite this paper

@article{domenico2014,
  title        = {{Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model}},
  author       = {Domenico Buccella},
  journal      = {Czech Economic Review},
  year         = {2014},
}

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Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.