Bail-in’s Unfulfilled Promise

Christos Hadjiemmanuil

European Business Organization Law Review2025https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-025-00338-9article
ABDC B
Weight
0.41

Abstract

The adoption of bail-in by the EU and other jurisdictions as the core tool of their bank resolution regimes promised to ensure the effective financial restructuring of failed banks with the resources of their own stakeholders, thereby achieving the financial stability objectives of resolution while making taxpayer-funded bailouts a thing of the past. In retrospect, despite its many positive effects, it is questionable whether bail-in has fully lived up to its promise. The operationalisation of the bail-in tool is still ongoing, with several legal and practical issues yet to be fully resolved. Furthermore, the tool’s actual use in resolution actions has so far been sporadic and uneven, undermining its credibility; in any event, significant doubts remain as to the appropriateness of bail-in in situations of system-wide distress.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-025-00338-9

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@article{christos2025,
  title        = {{Bail-in’s Unfulfilled Promise}},
  author       = {Christos Hadjiemmanuil},
  journal      = {European Business Organization Law Review},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-025-00338-9},
}

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Evidence weight

0.41

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.25 × 0.4 = 0.10
M · momentum0.55 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.