Judge Ideology and Corporate Tax Planning

Travis Chow et al.

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis2026https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109026102622article
FT50AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We investigate whether judges’ political ideology affects corporate tax behaviors. We find that firms engaging in less aggressive tax planning when Circuit Court judges are more liberal. Cross-sectionally, the deterrent effect of liberal judge ideology is more pronounced for firms that engage in judiciary-sensitive tax strategies, face higher enforcement risk from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or have larger reputational costs from tax disputes. Our findings further suggest that liberal judge ideology reduces firms’ R&D investments and market value by constraining tax planning. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of judge ideology for firm behavior in the context of corporate tax planning.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109026102622

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@article{travis2026,
  title        = {{Judge Ideology and Corporate Tax Planning}},
  author       = {Travis Chow et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109026102622},
}

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Judge Ideology and Corporate Tax Planning

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.