Global Warming Policy in a Federation

Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff

Journal of Public Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70111article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We explore alternate allocations of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions policies in a small open federation. Emissions result from consumption and production of a tradeable dirty good. Emissions control policies are based on social values which depend on the allocation of policy responsibility. Policies include emissions taxes and permit trading systems and involve administrative costs that can differ by level of government. We show that federal and regional optimal emission pricing policies are variants of Pigovian taxes, and there may be a role for tariffs when regional governments are responsible for emissions policy and the federal government makes interregional transfers.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70111

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@article{robin2026,
  title        = {{Global Warming Policy in a Federation}},
  author       = {Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff},
  journal      = {Journal of Public Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70111},
}

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Global Warming Policy in a Federation

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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