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Efficiency of Non-cooperative Emission Taxes in Perfectly Competitive Markets

Roland Lars Johannes Magnusson

Finnish Economic Papers2010article
ABDC B
Weight
0.26

Abstract

With the current efforts to regulate the emissions of greenhouse gases and other cross border pollutants, the question of environmental federalism is as important as ever. By generalising the model presented by Oates and Schwab (1987, 1988), we show that the well established result within environmental federalism, that the government of a small country has no incentive to depart from the cooperative choice of environmental standards, does not hold for pollutants that have regional or global characteristics, as e.g. sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide has.

Cite this paper

@article{roland2010,
  title        = {{Efficiency of Non-cooperative Emission Taxes in Perfectly Competitive Markets}},
  author       = {Roland Lars Johannes Magnusson},
  journal      = {Finnish Economic Papers},
  year         = {2010},
}

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Efficiency of Non-cooperative Emission Taxes in Perfectly Competitive Markets

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.