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Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data

Youngseok Park

Strategic Behavior and the Environment2019https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000089preprint
AJG 1
Weight
0.26

What the paper says

I study how social welfare depends on strategic communication between a scientist and a policymaker and examine how the policymaker responds to electoral concerns using Crawford and Sobel’s classic model. Defining the social welfare to be the welfare of representative agents, whose preferences may be different from those of the policymaker and/or the scientist, I find that ex-ante social welfare is maximized, regardless of the preferences of the representative agent, if and only if the preferences of both the policymaker and the scientist are perfectly aligned. Communication is deliberately distorted by the policymaker when he has electoral concerns in a democracy.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000089

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@article{youngseok2019,
  title        = {{Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data}},
  author       = {Youngseok Park},
  journal      = {Strategic Behavior and the Environment},
  year         = {2019},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1561/102.00000089},
}

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Rational Skeptics: On the Strategic Communication of Scientific Data

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Evidence weight

0.26

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.00 × 0.4 = 0.00
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.