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To insure or to smooth? Paternalistic rationales for mandatory retirement funding

Daniel Halliday

Economics and Philosophy2026https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267126100674article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

Abstract

It is often thought that compulsory retirement funding gains support from paternalistic considerations. This paper examines this claim. I argue that compulsory retirement funding is more coherent when understood as an attempt at temporal smoothing than counterfactual insurance. An implication is that any paternalistic case for retirement funding faces problems that are more severe than they would be if compulsory retirement funding were insurance. I label these the problems of ‘inverted bias’ and of the ‘arbitrariness of income from labour’. The paper then makes some suggestions about how these points about paternalism bear on the problem of justice in retirement funding.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267126100674

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@article{daniel2026,
  title        = {{To insure or to smooth? Paternalistic rationales for mandatory retirement funding}},
  author       = {Daniel Halliday},
  journal      = {Economics and Philosophy},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267126100674},
}

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To insure or to smooth? Paternalistic rationales for mandatory retirement funding

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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