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Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities

Lina Mallozzi et al.

Czech Economic Review2015article
ABDC C
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

In this work we study an N-player differential game, in which positive social externalities affect the payoffs of the players when they make an agreement. We divide the N players in two homogeneous groups, N1 developed countries and N2 developing countries. For the latter, we consider a damage-cost function that evolves in time. We imagine the externalities as the possibility that bilateral or multilateral agreements of various nature are by-products of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). After the determination of emissions solutions, we use the externalities to investigate whether it is possible to have a self-enforcing agreement on pollution emissions in the short run.

1 citation

Cite this paper

@article{lina2015,
  title        = {{Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities}},
  author       = {Lina Mallozzi et al.},
  journal      = {Czech Economic Review},
  year         = {2015},
}

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Differential Game Approach for International Environmental Agreements with Social Externalities

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.29 × 0.4 = 0.12
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.