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Group Size, Kant-Nash Interaction, and Public Goods

Julian Lamprecht

Public Finance Analysis / FinanzArchiv2025https://doi.org/10.1628/fa-2025-0004article
AJG 1ABDC B
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

This paper considers the private provision of a public good within a community, whose members are inclusive Kantian or Nashian optimizers. It is analyzed how a change in group size affects the mixed Kant-Nash equilibrium. Kantians face a trade-off when admitting a Nashian into the community. Even though the new member is a contributor, there is a negative externality, as the Kantians hypothetical cost of public good provision falls in group size. This can lead to a lower utility of Kantian individuals.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/fa-2025-0004

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@article{julian2025,
  title        = {{Group Size, Kant-Nash Interaction, and Public Goods}},
  author       = {Julian Lamprecht},
  journal      = {Public Finance Analysis / FinanzArchiv},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1628/fa-2025-0004},
}

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Group Size, Kant-Nash Interaction, and Public Goods

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.