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Ignorance Is Bliss? Information Avoidance in Litigation

Mehdi Ayouni et al.

American Law and Economics Review2025https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaf016article
AJG 2ABDC B
Weight
0.50

Abstract

This paper examines defendants’ choice to learn about their fault level and its impact on litigation outcomes. Fault-level information is free of cost and has a positive instrumental value for defendants. However, identity concerns can induce defendants to avoid the information. Information avoidance favors settlement relative to trial. Conversely, reputation concerns tend to increase the likelihood of trial and do not cause information avoidance. Public awareness of the incident makes trial more likely, particularly when the public interprets a settlement as a signal of high fault.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaf016

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@article{mehdi2025,
  title        = {{Ignorance Is Bliss? Information Avoidance in Litigation}},
  author       = {Mehdi Ayouni et al.},
  journal      = {American Law and Economics Review},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahaf016},
}

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Ignorance Is Bliss? Information Avoidance in Litigation

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.