EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production

Seongkyun Kim et al.

The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0022article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

This paper introduces ex ante information heterogeneity between players into an otherwise standard global game so that both a type with superior private information and that with inferior private information coexist. We first derive the condition under which a unique threshold equilibrium exists. We then show that less-informed (resp. more-informed) players are more likely to attack the regime than more-informed (resp. less-informed) players when (i) the fundamental is perceived to be weak (resp. strong) according to the public signal and (ii) the cost of attack is low (resp. high). We finally derive the implication of our finding on optimal information allocation problem in the context of team production.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0022

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@article{seongkyun2025,
  title        = {{EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production}},
  author       = {Seongkyun Kim et al.},
  journal      = {The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0022},
}

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EX-Ante Information Heterogeneity in Global Games Models with Application to Team Production

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.