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The Role of Information in Collective Decisions

Nicolás Figueroa et al.

Journal of the European Economic Association2026https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag001article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

We study how members of a group vote for public information. We argue, both theoretically and experimentally, that voters are more likely to vote for information to be acquired relative to their own individual willingness to pay for information when ex-ante disagreement is higher and ex-post disagreement is lower. Ex-ante and ex-post disagreement refer to the disagreement among group members over the best policy for the group to follow before and after information is acquired, respectively. We discuss how the results inform the debate over the role of the State in fostering progress, and the value of the wisdom of the crowd.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag001

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@article{nicolás2026,
  title        = {{The Role of Information in Collective Decisions}},
  author       = {Nicolás Figueroa et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvag001},
}

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The Role of Information in Collective Decisions

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.