SINGLE- VS. MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL LENIENCY POLICIES: AN EXPERIMENT
Jeong Yeol Kim
Abstract
As multinational corporations have become more common, the need for a multi-jurisdictional leniency program that allows antitrust authorities to recognize leniency applications submitted to other antitrust authorities has recently emerged. This paper employs a laboratory experiment to examine how multi-jurisdictional leniency policies affect cartel formation, deterrence, and detection compared with a single-jurisdictional policy. The findings confirm the deterrent effect of leniency policies on cross-border cartels but show that multi-jurisdictional leniency does not necessarily increase leniency applications. In particular, when antitrust authorities do not mutually guarantee full immunity for firms that self-report to different authorities, self-reporting declines, decreasing cartel exposure and increasing the number of successful cartels that are formed but remain unexposed.
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
| M · momentum | 0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.