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Potential in population games

Igal Milchtaich

Economic Theory2026https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01691-zarticle
AJG 3ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

A general, novel notion of potential in population games is presented. A population game is defined, very broadly, as any bivariate function $$g\left( {x,y} \right)$$ g x , y on a convex set in a linear topological space. This function may specify the payoff for an individual population member from choosing strategy $$x$$ x (in a symmetric population game) or the mean payoff to individuals from playing according to strategy profile $$x$$ x (in an asymmetric population game), with the choices in the population as a whole expressed by the population strategy $$y$$ y . These notions of population game and potential include a number of earlier notions as special cases. Potential is closely linked with (a general notion of) equilibrium. It increases along every improvement curve : the population-game analog of an improvement path in an $$N$$ N -player game.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01691-z

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@article{igal2026,
  title        = {{Potential in population games}},
  author       = {Igal Milchtaich},
  journal      = {Economic Theory},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01691-z},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

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