arbiter
JournalsAccount

Inflation and Regulation of Government Debt: US Historical Evidence

Jonathan L. Payne & Bálint Szőke

Annual Review of Financial Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-112823-015810article
AJG 3ABDC B
Weight
0.37

Abstract

Governments have often used two policy instruments to lower financing costs: the money supply to generate seigniorage and regulation of the financial system to increase demand for their interest-bearing bonds. Both involve trade-offs. This article marshals historical evidence and economic theories about how the US federal government has arranged monetary, financial, and fiscal systems since 1800 to lower its financing costs. In doing so, we infer evolving priorities of different US administrations.

1 citation

Open via your library →

Cite this paper

https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-112823-015810

Or copy a formatted citation

@article{jonathan2025,
  title        = {{Inflation and Regulation of Government Debt: US Historical Evidence}},
  author       = {Jonathan L. Payne & Bálint Szőke},
  journal      = {Annual Review of Financial Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-112823-015810},
}

Paste directly into BibTeX, Zotero, or your reference manager.

Flag this paper

Inflation and Regulation of Government Debt: US Historical Evidence

Flags are reviewed by the Arbiter methodology team within 5 business days.

Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.