For Better or Worse: Share Tenancy as Partnership

Mark A. DeWeaver & James Roumasset

Man and the Economy2025https://doi.org/10.1515/me-2024-0001article
AJG 1
Weight
0.50

What the paper says

We extend Cheung’s (Cheung, N. S. 1969. The Theory of Share Tenancy . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.) analysis of the consequences of risk and transaction costs for agricultural contract choice by considering the potential for land abuse on the part of the tenant in a dynamic context where the land-abuse decision is linked to the tenant’s decision to renew the contract. By offering appropriate share contracts, landlords can incentivize contract renewal, thereby both lowering the incentive for land abuse and preserving the tenant’s land-specific human capital. In our model, tenants decide each period whether to terminate their contracts and abuse landlord-owned assets based on prior and updated beliefs about the likelihood of bad seasons. Share contracts are shown to be more likely than lease contracts to survive one or more bad harvests.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/me-2024-0001

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@article{mark2025,
  title        = {{For Better or Worse: Share Tenancy as Partnership}},
  author       = {Mark A. DeWeaver & James Roumasset},
  journal      = {Man and the Economy},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/me-2024-0001},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.