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Two-Stage Quantity-Setting Games and Tacit Collusion

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Finnish Economic Papers2011article
ABDC B
Weight
0.35

Abstract

This paper considers a two-stage quantity-setting duopoly model. The paper classifies demand functions into the following four cases in terms of the goods relevance and strategic relevance between both firms: ‘substitute goods and strategic substitutes’, ‘substitute goods and strategic complements’, ‘complementary goods and strategic complements’ and ‘complementary goods and strategic substitutes’. The paper correlates each case with two opposite strategic commitments. The paper examines the possibility of tacit collusion in each of four cases.

1 citation

Cite this paper

@article{kazuhiro2011,
  title        = {{Two-Stage Quantity-Setting Games and Tacit Collusion}},
  author       = {Kazuhiro Ohnishi},
  journal      = {Finnish Economic Papers},
  year         = {2011},
}

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Two-Stage Quantity-Setting Games and Tacit Collusion

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Evidence weight

0.35

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.25 × 0.4 = 0.10
M · momentum0.20 × 0.15 = 0.03
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.