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Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations

Muhammed Ceesay et al.

The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0109article
AJG 2ABDC A
Weight
0.37

What the paper says

We examine a two-bidder auction setting in which the distributions for the bidders’ valuations are asymmetric over a support consisting of three elements. For the first price auction, for each parameter values we derive the unique Bayes Nash Equilibrium in closed form. We rely on this result to compare the revenue in the first price auction with the revenue in the second price auction. The latter is often revenue superior to the former, and we determine precisely, given a distribution for the value of a bidder, when a distribution for the value of the other bidder exists such that the first price auction is superior to the second price auction.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0109

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@article{muhammed2025,
  title        = {{Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations}},
  author       = {Muhammed Ceesay et al.},
  journal      = {The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2024-0109},
}

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Asymmetric Auctions with Discretely Distributed Valuations

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Evidence weight

0.37

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.16 × 0.4 = 0.06
M · momentum0.53 × 0.15 = 0.08
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.