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Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service

Martin Mattsson

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics2025https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20230672article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.46

Abstract

Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11 percent but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. (JEL D73, D83, H83, O17)

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20230672

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@article{martin2025,
  title        = {{Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service}},
  author       = {Martin Mattsson},
  journal      = {American Economic Journal: Applied Economics},
  year         = {2025},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20230672},
}

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Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence From the Bangladesh Civil Service

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Evidence weight

0.46

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.37 × 0.4 = 0.15
M · momentum0.60 × 0.15 = 0.09
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.