Do designated market makers provide liquidity during downward extreme price movements?
Mario Bellia et al.
What the paper says
We study the trading activity of designated market makers (DMMs) in electronic markets using a unique dataset with audit-trail information on trader classification. DMMs may either adhere to their market-making agreements and offer immediacy during periods of heavy selling pressure, or they might lean-with-the-wind to profit from private information. We test these competing theories during extreme (downward) price movements, which we detect using a novel methodology. We show that DMMs provide liquidity when the selling pressure is concentrated on a single stock, but consume liquidity (leaving liquidity provision to slower traders) when several stocks are affected. • We study designated market makers liquidity provision in Nyse-Euronext. • We show that they provide liquidity in case of extreme selling pressure concentrated on single stocks. • They instead consume liquidity when selling pressure is systematic. • We use a new identification method for extreme price movements, which crucially allows to assess the above results.
2 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.25 × 0.4 = 0.10 |
| M · momentum | 0.55 × 0.15 = 0.08 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.