Emission Tax and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility Under Relative Profit Performance Competition: Committed Versus Time‐Consistent Tax Policies
Mingqing Xing & Sang‐Ho Lee
What the paper says
This paper considers a green managerial delegation contract where the managers face a relative profit performance competition and examines the impact of emission taxes on a firm's environmental and social performances. When the owners can determine profit‐oriented environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR), we compare committed tax and time‐consistent tax cases and show that owners adopt ECSR only if the competition managers face is severe enough in both cases. The resulting industry profits are non‐monotone in the severity of competition only when firms adopt ECSR under a time‐consistent tax. Our findings suggest that the government should increase its credibility in the tax commitment when competition is intense, while it should coordinate with regulated firms regarding their optimal regulatory timing when competition is less severe and product substitutability is high.
7 citations
Evidence weight
Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40
| F · citation impact | 0.47 × 0.4 = 0.19 |
| M · momentum | 0.68 × 0.15 = 0.10 |
| V · venue signal | 0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03 |
| R · text relevance † | 0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20 |
† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.