Coordination and Sophistication

Larbi Alaoui et al.

Journal of the European Economic Association2026https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf068article
AJG 4ABDC A*
Weight
0.50

Abstract

How coordination can be achieved in isolated, one-shot interactions without communication and in the absence of focal points is a long-standing question in game theory. We show that a cost–benefit approach to reasoning in strategic settings delivers sharp theoretical predictions that address this central question. In particular, our model predicts that, for a large class of individual reasoning processes, coordination in some canonical games is more likely to arise when players perceive heterogeneity in their cognitive abilities, rather than homogeneity. In addition, and perhaps contrary to common perception, it is not necessarily the case that being of higher cognitive sophistication is beneficial to the agent. We show that subjects’ behavior in a laboratory experiment is consistent with the predictions of our model, and present evidence against alternative coordination mechanisms.

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https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf068

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@article{larbi2026,
  title        = {{Coordination and Sophistication}},
  author       = {Larbi Alaoui et al.},
  journal      = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
  year         = {2026},
  doi          = {https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaf068},
}

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Evidence weight

0.50

Balanced mode · F 0.40 / M 0.15 / V 0.05 / R 0.40

F · citation impact0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20
M · momentum0.50 × 0.15 = 0.07
V · venue signal0.50 × 0.05 = 0.03
R · text relevance †0.50 × 0.4 = 0.20

† Text relevance is estimated at 0.50 on the detail page — for your query’s actual relevance score, open this paper from a search result.